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Consider the following scenario: a defendant in a federal criminal
case is tried and acquitted in the Middle District of North Carolina.'
After her trial, the defendant moves in the trial court under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) ("Rule 41(e)") for the return of cer-
tain property2 seized by the government in relation to her prosecu-
tion.3 Federal agents seized the property during a portion of the crimi-
nal investigation that took place in the Southern District of California.
The former defendant, who is a pro se movant residing in the Middle
District of North Carolina, claims that the government is not com-
mencing forfeiture proceedings against the item in question and that
she is therefore lawfully entitled to it.4 The prosecutor introduced the
property into evidence during trial and the former defendant at-
tempted to suppress it, so the trial court has heard extensive evidence
related to the property and the underlying search and seizure. In re-
sponse to the Rule 41(e) motion, the government contends that it still
needs the subject property for a prosecution in the Middle District of
North Carolina against another individual.' The trial court looks to the
first sentence of Rule 41(e), which notes that a person seeking return
of seized property "may move the district court for the district in
t A.B. 1997, Harvard University; M.Sc. 1999, The Weizmann Institute of Science; J.D.
Candidate 2002, The University of Chicago.
1 FRCrP 18 governs venue in criminal trials. See FRCrP 18 (stating that "the prosecution
shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed").
2 Rule 41(e) only pertains to the return of personal and movable property and not real
property. See Mark S. Rhodes, 5 Orfield's Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules § 41:43 at
706 (Lawyer's Co-op 2d ed 1987) (stating that Rule 41(e) involves the "return of physical ob-
jects").
3 The Fourth Amendment requires that the government return property when it no longer
needs it, since otherwise the seizure becomes unreasonable. See FRCrP 41, Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to the 1989 Amendments (stating that "an aggrieved person may seek return of prop-
erty that has been unlawfully seized, and a person whose property has been lawfully seized may
seek return of property when aggrieved by the government's continued possession of it"). The
pertinent part of the Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated." US Const Amend IV.
4 See FRCrP 54(b)(5) (stating that "[The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] are not
applicable to ... civil forfeiture of property for violation of a statute of the United States").
5 See FRCrP 41(e) (stating that "reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access
and use of the property in subsequent proceedings").
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which the property was seized" for its return. Therefore, despite the
apparent suitability of hearing the merits of the motion in the trial
court, the judge dismisses the claim and instructs the criminal defen-
dant to refile the motion in the Southern District of California.
Was the decision by the trial court appropriate, or should the
court have ruled on the motion since it heard the criminal trial itself?
The Fourth' and Tenth8 Circuits hold that while the motion is a civil
complaint against the government, rather than part of the criminal
trial, Rule 41(e) governs.9 These courts therefore apply to the motion
Rule 41(e)'s venue rules, which they have interpreted to require ex-
clusive venue in the district of seizure. The Second Circuit agrees that
the motion is civil in nature, but argues that the trial court may none-
theless hear post-trial motions under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, whether or not the motion is styled under Rule 41(e)." Since it
does not reject the possibility that the district of seizure could have
heard the motion, the Second Circuit implies that either the trial court
or the district of seizure would be a proper venue for a post-trial mo-
tion. The Eighth Circuit has agreed with the Second Circuit's use of
ancillary jurisdiction, but ruled that the trial court is the only proper
venue in which to hear post-trial motions without addressing the po-
tential applicability of Rule 41(e)."
A resolution to the disagreement over the applicability of Rule
41(e) to post-trial motions and the proper venue for these motions is
necessary for two reasons. First, Rule 41(e) specifically involves vindi-
cation of an important constitutional provision -the right to be free
from unlawful searches and seizures. It is therefore extremely impor-
tant that a court fix the venue for such a motion to facilitate the most
accurate adjudication on the merits. The bright-line venue rules pro-
posed by the circuit courts might undermine this goal, and so it is nec-
essary to examine a solution that would achieve it.'2 Second, without a
6 Id.
7 See United States v Garcia, 65 F3d 17,20 (4th Cir 1995) (holding that Rule 41(e) applies
to post-trial motions for the return of seized property and that the proper venue to hear such
motions is the district in which the property was seized).
8 See Clymore v United States, 164 F3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir 1999) (adopting the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of the venue provisions in Rule 41(e)).
9 See note 17 and accompanying text.
10 See United States v Giovanelli, 998 F2d 116,118-19 (2d Cir 1993) (determining that the
trial court that presided over the underlying criminal proceedings has ancillary jurisdiction to
hear a post-trial motion to return property, irrespective of whether it is treated procedurally un-
der Rule 41(e)). For a discussion of the interplay between procedure and jurisdiction in post-trial
motions to return property, see Part II.A. For a discussion of ancillary jurisdiction and its role in
these motions, see text accompanying notes 34-38 and 73-75.
11 See Thompson v Covington, 47 F3d 974, 975 (8th Cir 1995) (per curiam) (directing a
.criminal defendant who filed a post-trial motion for return of property in the district of seizure
to refile in the trial court because the latter had ancillary jurisdiction to hear the motion).
12 An analogy is the "substantial-contacts test" developed by Second Circuit Judge Ralph
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solution to the disagreement, a situation could arise where there
would be a venue gap. For example, if a trial court in the Fourth Cir-
cuit ordered a criminal defendant to refile the motion in the district of
seizure, which happened to be located in the Eighth Circuit, the pos-
tures of the respective circuits would leave the former defendant
without a venue for her motion.
This Comment reviews the legislative history of Rule 41(e), which
clarifies that post-trial motions for return of property fall within its
scope. It also rejects the applicability of ancillary jurisdiction to post-
trial motions. The Comment, however, disagrees that Rule 41(e) ex-
plicitly directs these motions to the district of seizure. Rather, it argues
that while the language and legislative history of Rule 41(e) imply that
a single venue is appropriate for post-trial Rule 41(e) motions, neither
offers any guidance in choosing between the district of seizure and the
district of trial. Therefore, this Comment proposes that courts employ
a two-prong test to determine which venue is proper, thereby stream-
lining the adjudicative process.
Part I explains the operation of Rule 41(e), its legislative back-
ground, and the judicial construction of its provisions. It discusses how
the Rule's piecemeal drafting history led to the current disagreement
among the circuits over the applicability of Rule 41(e) to post-trial
motions and the operation of its venue rules. Part II provides a critical
analysis of the different circuits' treatments of the jurisdictional basis
for post-trial motions to return property and the applicability of Rule
41(e). This Part concludes that Rule 41(e) is the sole procedural tool
for post-trial motions to return property and that a single venue is
warranted, but that the Rule and its legislative history do not clarify
how to determine which venue is suitable.
Part III attempts to resolve the apparent legal dilemmas by for-
mulating a two-prong test to lay the proper venue for post-trial Rule
41(e) motions. The first prong of the proposed test is whether the trial
court needs to conduct additional factfinding to rule on the motion. If
it does not, then the proper venue is the district of trial. Otherwise, the
Winter to determine the proper venue for a criminal trial under FRCrP 18. See United States v
Reed, 773 F2d 477,481 (2d Cir 1985) (setting forth a balancing test to ascertain where an offense
was committed under FRCrP 18, including: "[1] the site of the defendant's acts, [2] the elements
and nature of the crime, [3] the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and [4] the suitability
of each district for accurate factfinding"). Judge Winter developed this balancing test to incorpo-
rate the policies inherent in Article III, § 2 and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution that
require courts to conduct criminal trials in the judicial district where the offense occurred. See
Charles Alan Wright, 2 Federal Practice and Procedure § 301 at 293-99 (West 3d ed 2000) (ex-
plaining that the framers placed extreme importance on a person's right to be tried where he
committed the alleged crime). Given that elements of a crime may take place in more than one
location, the test functions to find the best district for the trial. For additional discussion of the
substantial contacts test, see id § 302 at 309.
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court must look to the second prong of the proposed test, which in-
volves balancing three criteria: (1) judicial economy; (2) convenience
for the government attorney; and (3) the burden on the former defen-
dant. This Part first considers the policies incorporated into Rule 41(e)
itself and the criteria used to develop venue rules. It then employs this
foundation to formulate the test. Part III concludes by examining ap-
plications of the proposed test and reviewing its benefits.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF RULE 41(E)
This Part provides important background information on Rule
41(e). First, it examines the Rule's operation. Second, it reviews the
Rule's legislative history, focusing in particular on how the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee ("Advisory Committee") has re-
sponded to perceived gaps in Rule 41(e). Finally, this Part discusses
the factors leading to the current circuit split and outlines three com-
peting views of the Rule's applicability to post-trial motions and its
venue provisions.
A. Rule 41(e)'s Operation
Rule 41(e) reads as follows:
Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlaw-
ful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may
move the district court for the district in which the property was
seized for the return of the property on the ground that such per-
son is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The court
shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the deci-
sion of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be
returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be
imposed to protect access and use of the property in subsequent
proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made or comes
on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or infor-
mation is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress
under Rule 12.13
There are two available grounds for motions to return property
under Rule 41(e). First, an individual can claim that the property was
unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Con-
stitution and that the government therefore has no right to the prop-
erty." Additionally, or in the alternative, a movant may assert that the
13 FRCrP 41(e).
14 See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643,646-51,655-57 (1961) (noting that during a criminal pro-
ceeding, property that was seized by state or federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment should be returned and excluded from evidence).
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property is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, either because
the trial is complete, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or the govern-
ment has abandoned its investigation.'5 This second basis is qualified,
since courts will not entertain Rule 41(e) motions when the property
has been subject to judicial forfeiture.6 Interestingly, a motion filed
under Rule 41(e) commences a civil proceeding, even though it is con-
tained within the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Criminal
Rules").'7
B. Rule 41(e)'s Legislative History
Rule 41(e) has an intricate legislative history, likely a result of the
difficulty of designing procedural rules for criminal law.'8 When the
Rule was promulgated, the Advisory Committee noted that although
the Rule was primarily a restatement of prior practice, it changed ex-
isting law by permitting the motions only before a court and not be-
fore either a court or a commissioner subject to review by the court.
'9
The Committee stated that the "purpose [of this change was] to pre-
vent multiplication of proceedings," since channeling the motions to a
single location was "preferable."2
The Rule has since been amended twice in response to perceived
inadequacies and unclear language regarding who can make Rule
15 Courts have long held that seized property should be returned to the owner once the
government no longer has any need for it. See, for example, United States v Martinson, 809 F2d
1364, 1369 (9th Cir 1987) (stating that "[tihe person from whom the property is seized is pre-
sumed to have a right to its return, and the government has the burden of demonstrating that it
has a legitimate reason to retain the property").
16 See United States v McGlory, 202 F3d 664, 670 (3d Cir 2000) (stating that Rule 41(e) is
inapplicable after criminal proceedings as a means of obtaining review of judicial forfeitures).
This holding is based on the language of FRCrP 54(b)(5). See note 4.
17 James Wm. Moore, 27 Moore's Federal Practice § 641.194[3] at 641-348 & n 9 (Matthew
Bender 3d ed 1997 & Supp 2001) (collecting cases). This apparent inconsistency exists because
these motions are related to the Fourth Amendment, which outwardly does not implicate crimi-
nal matters but, rather, government conduct. However, since governmental searches and seizures
often relate to criminal prosecution, the Criminal Rules are an appropriate place for the proce-
dural vehicle to move for their return. Note also that there are a number of other proceedings
that may be criminal in nature but are deemed civil, including proceedings to recover fines and
penalties. See Mark S. Rhodes, 1 Orfield's Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules § 1:4 at 6
(Lawyers Co-op 2d ed 1985) (providing examples).
18 Consider Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 Yale L J
723,728-30 (1942) (discussing the complexity of calibrating criminal procedural rules to give ef-
fect to notions of justice in substantive criminal law).
19 The Supreme Court has held that the Advisory Committee's Note to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are entitled to interpretive "weight." Torres v Oakland Scavenger Co, 487 US
312, 316 (1988). Some courts defer to the Committee's Note in the context of construing the
Criminal Rules. See United States v Downin, 884 F Supp 1474,1479 (E D Cal 1995) (stating that
"the advisory committee notes more accurately reflect actual congressional intent and are thus
entitled to greater weight than other forms of legislative history").
20 FRCrP 41,Advisory Committee's Note to the 1944 Adoption.
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41(e) motions and which court should hear them." Initially, Rule 41(e)
simply provided that persons should move for return of seized prop-
erty in the district of seizure. However, the Rule was altered in 1972
to address instances when accused criminals made motions for return
of property following an indictment,3 and the Advisory Committee af-
firmed that these changes were intended to require that the trial court
hear the motions and treat them as motions to suppress evidence. 1
The idea behind restricting venue to a single location was both to
comply with a directive from the Supreme Court" and to comport with
the policy notions of judicial economy and convenience to the par-
21
ties.
Over time, questions arose regarding the applicability of Rule
41(e) to motions outside the context of the criminal trial. Specifically,
courts considered whether Rule 41(e) was the appropriate procedural
vehicle to make pre- and non-indictment motions for return of prop-
erty.27 Decisions on this matter conflicted greatly. Some courts held
that Rule 41(e) applied,2' others that it did not,29 and still others that
21 See FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments (dividing Rule
41(e) into Rule 41(e) and 41(f) to deal with motions for return of seized property that are cou-
pled with motions to suppress illegally seized evidence under FRCrP 12); FRCrP 41, Advisory
Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendments (changing the language regarding who may bring
Rule 41(e) motions, what the legal standard is for return of property, and who may hear Rule
41(e) motions).
22 See FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments (noting that under
the prior version of the rule, an aggrieved person could only move for return of property in the
district of seizure).
23 See id (describing the scope of the amendment).
24 See id (stating that subdivisions (e) and (f) "are intended to require the motion to sup-
press evidence to be made in the trial court rather than in the district in which the evidence was
seized as now allowed by the rule").
25 The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments states that the changes were
based on the Supreme Court's decision in DiBella v United States, 369 US 121, 132-33 (1962)
(discouraging courts from hearing Rule 41(e) motions in the district of seizure once the criminal
trial has begun). FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments.
26 The Advisory Committee focused on language in DiBella that channeling post-
indictment Rule 41(e) motions to the trial court will not only "avoid a needless duplication of ef-
fort by two courts and provide a more expeditious resolution of the controversy," but also pre-
vent "prejudice either to the Government or to the defendants, or both." FRCrP 41, Advisory
Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments.
27 In general, courts have long assumed jurisdiction to hear motions for return of unlaw-
fully seized property and for suppression of evidence, see Wise v Henkel, 220 US 556,558 (1911)
(ordering return of unlawfully seized property), even when no indictment is pending, see Go-
Bart Importing Co v United States, 282 US 344, 354-55 (1931) (permitting return of property in
the absence of an indictment). The relevant issue here is merely the applicability of Rule 41(e).
See also Part II.B.
28 See, for example, United States v Martinson, 809 F2d 1364,1369 (9th Cir 1987) (holding
that Rule 41(e) applies to pre-indictment motions for return of property).
29 See, for example, Matter of Search of 4801 Fyler Avenue, 879 F2d 385,387 (8th Cir 1989)
(stating that a court should construe a Rule 41(e) motion prior to the filing of criminal charges as
a suit in equity rather than under the Criminal Rules).
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the substance of the motions was the same whether or not brought
pursuant to Rule 41(e). 0
In apparent response to this disagreement, Rule 41(e) was
amended again in 1989 to eliminate language that the Advisory
Committee deemed "confusing."'" The new version of the Rule af-
firmed that Rule 41(e) was the appropriate vehicle to address the
harm inflicted on nonsuspects.32 The Advisory Committee added that
the Rule, as amended, "provides that an aggrieved person may seek
return of property that has been unlawfully seized, and a person
whose property has been lawfully seized may seek return of property
when aggrieved by the government's continued possession of it."33 On
this account, Rule 41(e) was intended to be the procedural tool for
moving in a federal court to return seized property in the absence of
an indictment.
C. The Circuit Split over Application of Rule 41(e) and the Meaning
of Its Venue Provisions for Post-Trial Motions for Return of
Property
The 1989 Amendment to Rule 41(e) did not directly address the
issue of the Rule's applicability to post-trial motions, probably be-
cause they were not the subject of significant debate. Prior to the 1989
Amendment, the few. courts that dealt with the issue assumed they
could hear the motions under the doctrine of ancillary 
jurisdiction.'"
Ancillary jurisdiction allows a court to hear a claim when it would
otherwise lack jurisdiction to ensure that the same court handles the
case in its entirety and to foster judicial economy." The exercise of an-
cillary jurisdiction is appropriate when:
30 See, for example, Hunsucker v Phinney, 497 F2d 29,34 (5th Cir 1974) (holding that it is
irrelevant for procedural purposes whether a court analyzes pre-indictment motions for return
of property under Rule 41(e)).
31 FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendments.
32 See id (noting that the previous version of the Rule "failed to address the harm that may
result from the interference with the lawful use of property by persons who are not suspected of
wrongdoing"). The Advisory Committee also stated that the new amendment "conform[ed] the
rule to the practice in most districts." Id.
33 Id.
34 See, for example, United States v Wilson, 540 F2d 1100, 1103-04 (DC Cir 1976) (holding
that the district court where a criminal defendant was tried could hear his post-trial Rule 41(e)
motion because the court's jurisdiction was ancillary to its jurisdiction over the underlying crimi-
nal proceedings).
35 See Morrow v District of Columbia, 417 F2d 728,740 (DC Cir 1969) (discussing the two
purposes of ancillary jurisdiction). One should not confuse ancillary jurisdiction with statutory
supplemental jurisdiction as codified in 28 USC § 1367 (1994). The statute requires that the dis-
trict court have original jurisdiction over an underlying civil action and does not apply when the
main proceedings are criminal. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Coo-
per, 13B Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567.3 at 66, 72 n 21 (West 2d ed 1986 & Supp 2000)
(stating that "[s]tatutory supplemental jurisdiction does not apply to a criminal case").
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(1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which
was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course
of the main matter, or is an integral part of the main matter; (2)
the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new
fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter
through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a sub-
stantial procedural or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary mat-
ter must be settled to protect the integrity of the main proceed-
ing or to insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will
not be frustrated.36
An exercise of ancillary jurisdiction by the trial court to hear a post-
trial motion for return of property inescapably requires that the venue
is the district of trial.
For venue purposes, it did not initially matter whether it was ap-
propriate for courts to use ancillary jurisdiction to hear these mo-
tions,7 since the district of trial and the district of seizure were typi-
cally the same. Over time, however, the question arose in instances
when the district of trial was different from the district of seizure. In
the post-trial context, uncertainty over the application of Rule 41(e)
and the meaning of its venue provisions has resulted in a number of
divergent interpretations.-
1. The Second Circuit.
The proper application of Rule 41(e) to post-trial motions was
first discussed in United States v Giovanelli.39 Although the disputed
property was seized in the Eastern District of New York, the Second
Circuit determined that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction permit-
ted the trial court in the Southern District of New York to hear the
criminal defendant's post-trial Rule 41(e) motion.' However, it is not
clear from the opinion whether the Giovanelli court believed that
Rule 41(e) was the appropriate procedural tool for post-trial motions
to return property. The court noted that since the underlying criminal
proceedings had concluded, the motion should be treated as a civil
equitable proceeding irrespective of whether it was treated proce-
durally under Rule 41(e),4 ' but it cited to a line of precedent in which
36 See Morrow, 417 F2d at 740 (setting forth the requirements for ancillary jurisdiction).
37 For a discussion of the jurisdictional basis behind Rule 41(e), see Part II.A.
38 The pre- and non-indictment debates never considered this issue since, by definition,
there was no district of trial.
39 998 F2d 116 (2d Cir 1992).
40 Id at 118-19. See also United States v Leal, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 1309, *3-7 (N D I11) (re-
jecting the Fourth Circuit's "district of seizure" approach to venue in post-trial Rule 41(e) mo-
tions and following the reasoning in Giovanelli). The Seventh Circuit has not ruled on the issue.
41 See Giovanelli, 998 F2d at 119 (stating that "[w]here criminal proceedings are no longer
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the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was under Rule 41(e).2 Moreover,
the court did not object to the use of Rule 41(e), nor to the idea that
the motion could have been heard in the district of seizure.3 These ap-
parently conflicting statements result in two possible interpretations:
(1) Rule 41(e) applies to post-trial motions and concurrent venue is
proper under the Rule; or (2) post-trial motions can be heard in either
the district of trial or the district of seizure, but a motion in the district
of trial requires use of ancillary jurisdiction and a motion in the dis-
trict of seizure must be pursuant to Rule 41(e).
2. The Eighth Circuit.
In Thompson v Covington," the Eighth Circuit was faced with a
problem similar to that in Giovanelli."5 The criminal defendant was
tried in the District of Minnesota, but during the criminal investiga-
tion the government seized related property in Kansas City. 1 Follow-
ing his trial, the defendant moved in the Western District of Missouri
for return of the seized property, which the district court rejected on
the merits.47 On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit cited Giovanelli
without mentioning Rule 41(e) and held that since the motion was a
civil matter, the trial court should have heard it under the doctrine of
pending against the defendant such motion is treated as a civil equitable proceeding even if
styled as being pursuant to [Rule] 41(e)"), quoting Soviero v United States, 967 F2d 791,792-93
(2d Cir 1992). Later, in a case where the districts of trial and seizure were the same, a different
Second Circuit panel rejected the use of Rule 41(e) for post-trial motions. See Toure v United
States, 24 F3d 444,445 (2d Cir 1994) ("Toure's complaint, seeking a return of seized property af-
ter the conclusion of the underlying criminal case, is [not] properly treated as ... a motion pursu-
ant to [FRCrP] 41(e)."). Rather, it held that they should be treated as commencing a civil action
under the Little Tucker Act. See 28 USC § 1346(a)(2) (1994) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction ... [over] any other civil action or claim against the United States, not ex-
ceeding $10,000 in amount."). However, the Little Tucker Act cannot be a basis of jurisdiction for
post-trial motions to return property, since it pertains to claims for monetary damages rather
than injunctive relief. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 14
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3657 at 502-09 (West 3d ed 1998) (stating that as a general mat-
ter, the Little Tucker Act only allows claims for damages, not injunctive relief).
42 See Giovanelli, 998 F2d at 119, citing Mora v United States, 955 F2d 156, 158 (2d Cir
1992), for the proposition that a court can hear a post-trial motion under the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction. Mora cites to United States v Wilson, 540 F2d 1100 (DC Cir 1976), which held that
the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was pursuant to Rule 41(e). See id at 1103-04.
43 In their rejections of the Second Circuit's jurisprudence on post-trial Rule 41(e) mo-
tions, the Fourth and the Tenth Circuits interpreted this holding to permit a motion in either the
trial court or the district of seizure. See Clymore v United States, 164 F3d 569,574 (10th Cir 1999)
(distinguishing between the holdings in Giovanelli and the Eighth Circuit's "district of trial" ap-
proach); United States v Garcia, 65 F3d 17, 20 (4th Cir 1995) (same).
44 47 F3d 974 (8th Cir 1995) (per curiam).
45 See id at 974 (discussing the factual posture where the district of seizure and the district
of trial were not the same).
46 See id.
47 See id at 974-75.
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ancillary jurisdiction." It therefore directed the defendant to refile the
motion in the District of Minnesota, which it described as "the proper
district court" for the motion.' In essence, the court rejected the pos-
sibility of making a post-trial motion in the district of seizure and
stated that the trial court is the exclusive venue for the proceedings.
However, since the Thompson court agreed with Giovanelli, which
dealt with a post-trial motion made pursuant to Rule 41(e), but did
not discuss Rule 41(e) itself, it is not clear from the opinion whether:
(1) Rule 41(e) is applicable and its venue provisions compel the dis-
trict of trial for post-trial motions;0 or (2) Rule 41(e) is inapplicable
and a court must hear a post-trial motion to return property using an-
cillary jurisdiction," which necessitates venue in the trial court.
3. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits.
In United States v Garcia,2 the criminal defendant was tried in the
Eastern District of North Carolina, but had been arrested in Florida.3
During his arrest, the government seized various personal items. After
his trial, the defendant moved in the trial court for their return pursu-
ant to Rule 41(e), but the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that while a post-trial motion for re-
turn of property is a civil action, the holdings in Giovanelli and
Thompson are contrary to the plain language of Rule 41(e)." The
court asserted that although a "reasonable interpretation" of Rule
41(e) is that the trial court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear motions to
return property during the trial itself, the first sentence of the Rule
clearly directs the motion to the district of seizure at all other times."
Therefore, the court concluded that the district court does not retain
ancillary jurisdiction over Rule 41(e) motions following the conclu-
48 Idat 975.
49 Id (emphasis added).
50 The Tenth Circuit believes that this is the proper interpretation of the holding in
Thompson. See Clymore v United States, 164 F3d 569, 574 (10th Cir 1999) (summarizing the
Eighth Circuit's holding that the district court that presided over the criminal matter was "the
only proper district to entertain a Rule 41(e) motion") (emphasis added).
51 The Fourth Circuit views this as the correct way to read Thompson. See United States v
Garcia, 65 F3d 17, 20 (4th Cir 1995) (noting that the Eighth Circuit held that "a filing in the dis-
trict of seizure, as required by the rule, is not proper," but did not formulate this posture in the
context of Rule 41(e)).
52 65 F3d 17 (4th Cir 1995).
53 Idat 18.
54 Id at 18-19.
55 Id at 19-20. See also United States v Leal, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 1309, *6 (N D I11) (de-
scribing the Fourth Circuit's holding as "[b]ased on a plain reading of rule 41(e) venue lan-
guage").
56 Garcia, 65 F3d at 20.
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sion of the criminal case and the proper venue for the motions is the
district of seizure."
The Fourth Circuit offered two reasons for its interpretation of
Rule 41(e). First, the Garcia court looked to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 1 ("Rule 1")," which provides that the Criminal Rules ap-
ply not only to criminal proceedings, but also "whenever specifically
provided in one of the rules, to preliminary, supplementary, and spe-
cial proceedings before United States magistrate judges and at pro-
ceedings before state and local judicial officers."59 The court reasoned
that since Rule 41(e) is contained within the section of the Criminal
Rules entitled "Supplementary and Special Proceedings," the civil na-
ture of the proceeding does not bar the applicability of Rule 41(e) and
its venue provisions to post-trial motions. Second, the Fourth Circuit
looked to the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendment for
Rule 41(e), and claimed that since the Rule applied to pre- and non-
indictment motions to return property, it is also the procedural tool
for post-trial motions. The court therefore suggested that the movant
seek return of his property in the Southern District of Florida.6
In Clymore v United States, 2 the Tenth Circuit weighed in on the
developing circuit split and agreed with the Garcia court.6 The Cly-
more court held that when the underlying criminal proceedings have
concluded, Rule 41(e) applies to motions to return property and the
proper venue is the district of seizure." It therefore suggested that the
criminal defendant, whose criminal trial had taken place in the Dis-
trict of New Mexico, refile in the district of seizure, 
in Texas.6
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURTS' VENUE DETERMINATIONS FOR
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
The controversy over both the applicability of Rule 41(e) to post-
trial motions and the proper venue for these motions results from the
Rule's piecemeal drafting history and the use of ancillary jurisdiction.
The dispute ultimately reduces to two issues. First, is Rule 41(e) the
sole vehicle for making post-trial motions to return seized property?
Second, if Rule 41(e) does apply to post-trial motions, how do its
57 Id at 20-21.
58 Id at 20.
59 FRCrP 1.
60 Garcia, 65 F3d at 20.
61 Id at 21 (stating that "Garcia's suit should have been brought in the Southern District of
Florida").
62 164 F3d 569 (10th Cir 1999).
63 Id at 574-75 (noting that "we agree with the Fourth Circuit").
64 Id.
65 Id at 575 (asserting that "the claim should have been dismissed without prejudice to re-
file in the district of seizure").
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venue provisions work? This Part examines these two questions. First,
it clarifies the jurisdictional basis for adjudicating Rule 41(e) motions.
Second, this Part reviews the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit for its
use of Rule 41(e) for post-trial motions to return property. It argues
that the Rule is the sole avenue of relief to recover seized property in
the post-trial context. Finally, it discusses the resulting uncertainty re-
garding the proper venue for post-trial Rule 41(e) motions.
A. The Jurisdictional Basis Behind Rule 41(e)
There is no question that a motion to return property seized by
federal officers belongs in federal court.6 However, the precise juris-
dictional basis behind Rule 41(e) motions is not entirely clear-as
evidenced by the considerable confusion among authorities regarding
the issue. First, some consider Rule 41(e) as a statutory grant of juris-
diction.67 This reasoning is misplaced, since a rule of procedure cannot
be the basis of jurisdiction.6' Others have asserted that Rule 41(e) is
based on the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.6 However,
since jurisdiction in the federal district courts is supposed to derive
from some act of Congress, the better view is that it either comes from
or is directly related to a federal statute.° Therefore, Rule 41(e) likely
has one of two jurisdictional sources: general federal criminal jurisdic-
tion," or general federal question jurisdiction." The primary issue re-
66 See William R. Slomanson, Civil Action for Return of Property: "Anomalous" Federal Ju-
risdiction in Search of Justification, 62 Denver U L Rev 741,744 (1985) (noting that "[olne prac-
tical aspect of this area of the law is nevertheless clear: when property is held by federal officers,
aggrieved individuals must seek its return in a federal court").
67 See, for example, Rhodes, 5 Orfield's Criminal Procedure § 41:43 at 707 n 13 (cited in
note 2) ("Rule 41(e) can be the basis for federal court jurisdiction.").
68 See Washington-Southern Navigation Co v Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co, 263
US 629, 635 (1924) ("[N]o rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction."). See also Rules
Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072(b) (1994) (stating that rules of procedure in the federal courts
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"). There is a plausible argument that
a rule of procedure can define the scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts in the absence of a
congressional statute. See Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion
and Jurisdictional Dismissals after Ruhrgas, 68 U Chi L Rev 193, 219 & n 135 (2001) (arguing
that FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) may "enlarge" personal jurisdiction because Congress has not provided
otherwise). However, in the case of Rule 41(e), there are statutory bases for jurisdiction, and
hence this position is inapplicable.
69 See, for example, Smith v Katzenbach, 351 F2d 810, 815 (DC Cir 1965) ("[Rule 41] is a
crystallization of a principle of equity jurisdiction.").
70 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3522 at 61 n 2 (West 2d ed 1984) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that those courts scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits that a federal statute has defined.") (citation
omitted).
71 See 18 USC § 3231 (1994) ("The district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States."). Jurisdiction over Rule 41(e) motions could be derived from this grant. See James C.
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garding post-trial motions for return of property, however, is whether
Rule 41(e) is the sole procedural vehicle for accessing federal jurisdic-
tion in the post-criminal trial context. If it is, then the Rule's venue
provisions apply.
However, irrespective of the Rule's applicability, ancillary juris-
diction can never be a basis of jurisdiction to hear post-trial motions
for return of property. First, it is never possible to fulfill the require-
ment that a court must hear the ancillary matter so as not to frustrate
the main disposition." Motions for return of property are civil pro-
ceedings that are not part of the criminal trial,
74 and whether or not a
court returns seized property is independent of the ultimate judgment
of guilt or innocence in the criminal case if the property is not being
forfeited. Second, ancillary jurisdiction involves the assertion of juris-
diction over: (1) claims for which the federal court lacks independent
subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) disputes involving nonparties to the
main proceeding. As discussed above, however, there are statutory
bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction over post-trial motions to
return property, and the motions do not involve third parties. There-
fore, the Second and Eighth Circuits were incorrect to advocate use of
ancillary jurisdiction for post-trial motions to return property, and
courts should not apply the doctrine in this context.
B. The Applicability of Rule 41(e) to Post-Trial Motions
The first issue for resolution is the scope of Rule 41(e). The
Fourth Circuit, the only circuit to explain its use of Rule 41(e) for
post-trial motions, posited two reasons for applying Rule 41(e). The
first rationale was based on the language of Rule 1. The court stated
that while post-trial motions for the return of property are civil pro-
ceedings, the appendix to the Criminal Rules lists Rule 41(e) under
"Supplementary and Special Proceedings," and therefore Rule 1
shows that the Criminal Rules apply because it states that they govern
the procedure for supplementary and 
special proceedings."
Colihan, Note, Mason v. Pulliham and Anomalous Jurisdiction: Stating a Claim and Obtaining Ju-
risdiction to Assert Fourth Amendment Violations When No Indictment Is Pending, 64 Va L Rev
85, 90 n 50 (1978) (arguing for such derived powers).
72 See 28 USC § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all the
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). See also Slo-
manson, 62 Denver U L Rev at 752-54 (cited in note 66) (arguing that federal question jurisdic-
tion is the basis of pre-indictment motions for return of property).
73 See text accompanying note 36.
74 See note 17 and accompanying text.
75 See Moore, 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 106.03[4] at 106-13 to 106-15 (cited in note 41)
(describing the purpose and use of ancillary jurisdiction).
76 Garcia, 65 F3d at 20 (analyzing the text of Rule 1).
77 Id.
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This reasoning for the applicability of Rule 41(e), however, is not
correct. A close examination of Rule 1 shows that the Garcia court
misread it. Rule 1 provides:
These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceedings in
the courts of the United States as provided in Rule 54(a); and,
whenever specifically provided in one of the rules, to preliminary,
supplementary, and special proceedings before United States
magistrate judges and at proceedings before state and local judi-
cial officers."8
Looking at Rule 1 in its entirety, it says that the Criminal Rules
apply to supplementary and special proceedings that are before mag-
istrate judges." Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reading, for Rule
41(e) to apply to post-trial motions because it is either a supplemen-
tary or a special proceeding would seem to require that the motions
only be heard by magistrate judges and not Article III judges, which is
not how the Rule is administered.'° Thus, the Garcia court's Rule 1-
based reasoning for the applicability of Rule 41(e) to post-trial mo-
tions is not persuasive.
The second justification for the application of Rule 41(e) consid-
ered by the Garcia court comes from Rule 41(e)'s legislative history.'
In its note to the 1989 Amendments, the Advisory Committee asserted
that the Rule is intended to cover "harm that may result from inter-
ference with the lawful use of property by persons who are not sus-
pected of wrongdoing." If the language of Rule 41(e) is broad
enough to include an unindicted movant's claim for return of seized
property, then it should certainly apply to a post-trial motion, which is
more closely connected to criminal matters. In addition, the Advisory
Committee stated that Rule 41(e), as amended, "provides that ... a
person whose property has been lawfully seized may seek return of
property when aggrieved by the government's continued possession of
78 FRCrP 1.
79 An example is Rule 41(a), which explicitly discusses proceedings before "a magistrate
judge." FRCrP 41(a).
80 Rule 41(e) proceedings may be conducted before Article III judges or magistrates. The
Rule's language was changed from "judge" to "court" in the second sentence to permit both a
magistrate and a district court judge to make findings on a motion for return of property; the
Rule thus encompasses magistrates whenever it uses the word "court." See FRCrP 41, Advisory
Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendments. See also Matter of Search of 4330 North 35th Street,
142 FRD 161, 165 (E D Wis 1992) (noting that both magistrates and district court judges may ex-
ercise jurisdiction over motions for seized property because of the word "court" in Rule 41(e)).
81 See Garcia, 65 F3d at 20 (reviewing the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1989
Amendments to Rule 41(e)).
82 FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendments. See notes 31-33 and
accompanying text.
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it."' This language appears to relate directly to a post-trial situation
where the government no longer needs the property and the criminal
defendant is legally entitled to its return.8 Therefore, Rule 41(e) is
applicable to post-trial motions for return of property, and the Fourth
Circuit's holding on this issue was correct despite some problems with
its reasoning.
Moreover, if Rule 41(e) applies to post-trial motions to return
seized property, there are two reasons why it is therefore the sole pro-
cedural vehicle for this action. First, although procedural rules apply
to the full range of cases within a federal court's jurisdiction,'
5 it is
logical that if Congress specifically promulgated a rule to enforce a
particular constitutional right, then one should utilize that rule to the
exclusion of others when making the pertinent claim. Second, even if
an individual used the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring an
action for return of property,' the venue provisions of Rule 41(e)
would still apply. The general venue statute sets forth the proper
venue for civil actions against the United States, its agencies, and its
officers, "except as otherwise provided by law.
'' " If Rule 41(e) applies
to post-trial motions for return of property, then it functions as an ex-
ception to the general venue statutes and restricts the permissible lo-
cations. Therefore, a court should treat any post-trial motion to return
property as a motion pursuant to Rule 41(e).
C. The Venue Provisions of Rule 41(e)
Because Rule 41(e) is the procedural device to move for return
of property, a court adjudicating such a motion must interpret the
Rule's venue requirements. This necessitates an examination of the
Rule's structure and legislative history.
1. Rule 41(e) encompasses two potential judicial districts.
The first sentence of Rule 41(e) reads that a person "may move
the district court in which the property was seized."" This appears to
be the default venue provision. The latter part of the Rule, however,
provides that the motion can be made "in the district of trial.
89 There-
fore, as a general matter, the language of Rule 41(e) presents two con-
ceivable locations where it is possible to bring a motion to return
83 Id.
84 See notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
85 See, for example, FRCrP 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceed-
ings in the courts of the United States.").
86 See FRCP 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
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seized property. The question then becomes whether one of these two
judicial districts is the only proper venue in certain instances.
2. Rule 41(e) is silent with respect to post-trial motions.
When a motion is made following an indictment but still during
trial, the Rule limits venue to the trial court." Pre- and non-indictment
motions will take place in the district of seizure, since by definition
there is no district of trial. However, Rule 41(e) itself does not directly
address post-trial motions. The Fourth Circuit argued that the default
venue provision of the district of seizure applies." Although this rea-
soning is persuasive, it is not entirely compelling. The Rule's first sen-
tence does not require that the motion be made in the district of sei-
zure except in certain circumstances. It only permits a person to move
in the district of seizure; it does not mandate that a person move in the
district of seizure.9 Moreover, the Rule's legislative history does not
specifically address the proper venue for post-trial motions. Thus
while Rule 41(e) clearly specifies venue to hear the motions during
trial and in pre- and non-indictment instances, it fails to do so for post-
trial motions.
3. Concurrent venue for post-trial motions is not warranted
from this silence.
At first glance, this conclusion supports the idea that Rule 41(e)
mandates concurrent venue for post-trial motions. However, three
reasons support limiting post-trial motions to a single proper venue.
First, since the Rule limits motions to a single proper venue in pre-
and non-indictment scenarios and during the criminal trial itself, lay-
ing venue in one location for post-trial motions makes the rule inter-
nally consistent.3 Second, Rule 41(e)'s legislative history demonstrates
the Advisory Committee's commitment to developing a single proper
venue for motions under the Rule.9 Third, given both the constitu-
90 This is only evident from looking at both Rule 41(e) and its legislative history. See notes
31-33 and accompanying text.
91 See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
92 See Garcia, 65 F3d at 21 (Murnaghan dissenting) (rejecting the argument that Rule
41(e) limits venue to the district of seizure). See also United States v Leal, 1996 US Dist LEXIS
1309, *6-7 (N D I11) (asserting that Rule 41(e) does not require that a movant file only in the dis-
trict in which property was seized).
93 Consider John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 Cal L Rev 59,59-65 (1987) (arguing for consis-
tency in the interpretation of rules).
94 See FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1944 Adoption (stating that the new
rule was adopted to "prevent multiplication of proceedings" by limiting the forum for Rule 41(e)
motions to a court). In the Note to the 1972 Amendments, the Committee maintained that it re-
drafted the Rule to restrict post-indictment motions to the trial court. See notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text.
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tional concerns implicated by Rule 41(e) itself and the principles be-
hind venue rules," the factual background of a Rule 41(e) motion will
virtually always favor hearing the motion in one judicial district over
the other.96 Even the Giovanelli court, which appeared to allow venue
in multiple courts, recognized that the "facts" of that case made the
trial court the suitable location to adjudicate it.
97 Therefore, post-trial
Rule 41(e) motions should have a single proper venue. However,
given the lack of direction from both Rule 41(e) and its legislative his-
tory, an exploration of what "facts" might direct the motion to one ju-
dicial district rather than the other is warranted.
III. A TWO-PRONG TEST TO DETERMINE PROPER VENUE FOR
POST-TRIAL RULE 41(E) MOTIONS
Rule 41(e) is the sole procedural vehicle for post-trial motions to
return seized property, and such motions should fix venue in a single
location. However, neither the Rule nor its legislative history provides
guidance as to which judicial district is proper. This Part proposes a
two-prong test to resolve this issue. First, this Part examines both the
constitutional concerns incorporated into Rule 41(e) and the princi-
ples for crafting venue rules in order to establish a policy foundation
for the test. Second, it sets forth and explains the test: (1) if the trial
court has heard evidence relevant to the motion such that additional
factfinding is unnecessary, then the district of trial is the proper venue;
(2) otherwise, the court should balance three criteria to ascertain
venue: (a) judicial economy; (b) convenience for the government at-
torney; and (c) the burden on the former defendant. Finally, this Part
explains the application of the proposed test and discusses its benefits.
A. Policy Considerations Behind the Two-Prong Test
There are two relevant factors in formulating a test to set the
proper venue for post-trial Rule 41(e) motions. First, Rule 41(e) in-
volves vindication of an important constitutional right-namely the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the lodestar in laying venue should be
accurate adjudication on the merits rather than mere procedural clar-
95 Part III.A addresses this position and uses these policy considerations to formulate the
proposed solution. It argues two points. First, because Rule 41(e) involves vindication of a consti-
tutional right, it is critical that venue lay in the court that will most accurately adjudicate the mo-
tion. Second, given that Rule 41(e) motions are hybrid civil-criminal proceedings, the policies
that inform the development of venue rules should be judicial economy and fairness to both par-
ties.
96 See Part III.C for a discussion of how to apply the proposed test.
97 Giovanelli, 998 F2d at 119 (stating that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in order to
hear the motion in the district of trial "is especially appropriate on the facts here before us").
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ity, a goal implicit in the bright-line rules advocated by the circuit
courts. Moreover, it is acceptable to interpret Rule 41(e) in this man-
ner because it is a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, and therefore
courts should construe it in light of underlying policy objectives" in-
stead of to promote simplicity, as required for the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.°°
Second, it is necessary to illuminate what criteria will ensure that
a test to determine venue for post-trial motions will comport with this
principle. There are three relevant considerations: (1) judicial econ-
omy; (2) fairness to the government attorney; and (3) fairness to the
former defendant. There are two reasons why these factors should
govern. First, the Advisory Committee has used these criteria to lay
venue for Rule 41(e) motions in other instances.' Second, given that
Rule 41(e) implicates both civil and criminal venue concerns,"'8 these
three standards represent the sum total of the principles used to de-
velop civil and criminal venue rules. Civil venue rules function to
promote judicial economy and convenience to the defendant,'8
which in this case is the government. Criminal venue rules, on theother hand, operate to foster fairness to the criminal defendant.9 8
98 See Part I.C.
99 See Fallen v United States, 378 US 139, 142 (1964) (stating that the Criminal Rules "are
not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective of the
circumstances"); Charles Alan Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure § 32 at 32-33 (West 3d
ed 1999) ("[The Criminal Rules] are not to be applied ritualistically, but are to be construed in
the flexible spirit contemplated by [FRCrP] 2."); Rhodes, 1 Orfield's Criminal Procedure § 2:4 at
32 (cited in note 17) (same); Alexander Holtzoff ed, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with
Notes and Institute Proceedings 120-21 (NYU Law 1946) ("[FRCrP] 2 expresses the spirit that is
intended to motivate the application of all the sixty rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
and to make it very clear that they are not in any case to be interpreted technically so as to de-
feat the ends of justice.").
100 See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 620 (1997) (stating that courts must
not use "judicial inventiveness" to overcome "the text of a rule").
101 In its Note to the 1972 Amendments, the Committee stressed that the trial court was the
sole proper venue for motions made during trial because it would "provide a more expeditious
resolution of the controversy" and prevent "prejudice either to the Government or the defen-
dants, or both." FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1972 Amendments.
102 See Matthews v United States, 917 F Supp 1090, 1100 (E D Va 1996) (noting that when a
person makes a post-trial Rule 41(e) motion, a "strict division between civil and criminal pro-
ceedings does not exist"); Slomanson, 62 Denver U L Rev at 741 (cited in note 66) (referring to
Rule 41(e) as a "hybrid civil-criminal procedural vehicle").
103 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 15 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3801 at 3 n 4 (West 2d ed 1986) (noting that civil venue provisions are "designed
to protect ... courts from inconvenient lawsuits").
104 See Leroy v Great Western United Corp, 443 US 173, 183-84 (1979) (stating that civil
venue rules are generally designed to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will
select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial).
105 See James Wm. Moore, 25 Moore's Federal Practice § 618.02 at 618-8 (Matthew Bender
3d ed 1997 & Supp 2001) (noting that criminal venue provisions operate to "protect[ ] federal
defendants from unfairness and hardship in defending themselves against federal prosecutors").
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Therefore, any proposed venue should revolve around these three fac-
tors.
B. The Two-Prong Test
1. If the trial court has already conducted all the relevant fact-
finding, then the proper venue is the district of trial.
Given the aforementioned policy considerations, if the trial court
has already reviewed evidence on the subject property to the extent
that it does not need to engage in additional factfinding, then judicial
economy concerns are dispositive and the trial court should hear the
motion. The reason one factor should be outcome determinative in
certain circumstances is to make the proposed test consistent with
other multifactor analyses to determine the proper venue under a
Criminal Rule.9 If there must be a dispositive factor, there are two ar-
guments why complete factfinding by the trial court should determine
venue in the case of Rule 41(e) motions. First, the main task of a court
in adjudicating a Rule 41(e) motion is to make the relevant findings of
fact.'°9 Given this specification, it seems that if the trial court has al-
ready conducted the necessary factfinding, then its consequent ability
speedily to resolve the matter points towards fixing venue in the dis-
trict of trial.'° Second, courts often indicate that judicial economy is
the key issue in laying venue for post-trial Rule 41(e) motions, and
complete factfinding by the trial court will only maximize the weight
of this concern."
2. If the trial court needs to conduct additional factfinding, then
a balancing test should determine venue.
However, if the trial court needs additional facts to adjudicate the
motion, then it should determine venue by balancing three considera-
tions: (1) judicial economy; (2) convenience for the government attor-
ney; and (3) the burden on the former defendant.
106 In Platt v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co, 376 US 240 (1964), the Supreme
Court set forth a ten-prong balancing test for transfers of venue under FRCrP 21(b). See id at
243-44. Four of these factors are "generally decisive." Moore, 25 Moore's Federal Practice
§ 621.04[4][b] at 621-22 n 15 (cited in note 105). However, if the four dispositive criteria "do not
clearly point to a particular district as the proper FRCrP 21(b) venue," then courts must consider
all ten factors to lay venue. Id § 621.04[4][c] at 621-24.
107 See FRCrP 41(e) ("The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the
decision of the motion.").
108 The standard governing the dispositive factors is whether they clearly point to a particu-
lar district as the proper venue. See note 106 and accompanying text.
109 See Clymore, 164 F3d at 575 (claiming that laying venue in the district of seizure will
"conform[ ] more closely to ... the practicalities of judicial administration"); United States v Leal,
1996 US Dist LEXIS 1309, *7 (N D Ill) (maintaining that hearing the motion in the trial court
comports with "judicial economy objectives").
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a) Judicial economy. The primary factor a court should examine
to gauge the gravity of the judicial economy concerns is the extent of
the necessary factfinding. If it is marginal, this criterion points towards
hearing the case in the district of trial, but if it is considerable, it mili-
tates in favor of the district of seizure. More precise factors a court
might consider are: (1) the location of possible witnesses; (2) the loca-
tion of documents and records likely to be involved; and (3) the
docket condition of the relevant districts or divisions.
0
b) Convenience for the government attorney. The specific issue
here is whether the government has a continued need for the subject
property beyond the criminal trial."' Rule 41(e) explicitly provides for
these contingencies, and permits a court to condition the return of
property on future access for and use by the government in subse-
quent proceedings."2 If the government has a continuing need for the
property, it favors hearing the motion in the relevant judicial district,
since this will enable the prosecutor who will require the property to
argue the motion. However, this factor becomes a nullity if the gov-
ernment does not need the property..3 or requires the property in a lo-
cation that is within neither the district of trial nor the district of sei-
zure.
c) Burden on the former defendant. The choice of venue should
act to minimize potential difficulties for the former defendant in pre-
senting her arguments. Therefore, a court should assess whether hear-
ing the motion in another district will impose a substantial additional
burden on the former defendant. The issues a court might consider for
this determination are: (1) the location of the former defendant; (2)
the location of counsel,"' if the former defendant has representation;
110 These criteria are three of the Platt factors. See Platt v Minnesota Mining & Manufactur-
ing Co, 376 US 240,243-44 (1964).
111 Examples include subsequent criminal prosecutions against other individuals and civil
actions that follow a criminal prosecution, such as a civil antitrust suit, both of which may require
the subject property for evidentiary purposes.
112 See FRCrP 41(e) ("[R]easonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and use
of the property in subsequent proceedings.").
113 An assertion by the government that it has no need for the claimed property does not
mean that adjudication of the motion is a mere formality. A court may still have to determine
whether the government actually seized the property or if the government returned the items in
question. The court will also have to decide whether the property belongs to the former defen-
dant. See the FRCrP 41, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1989 Amendments ("As amended,
subdivision (e) provides for a return of the property if the person is entitled to lawful posses-
sion."). See also Charles Alan Wright, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure § 673 at 763 (West 2d ed
1982) (noting that a movant under Rule 41(e) "must show that he is entitled to lawful possession
of the [subject] property").
114 Since Rule 41(e) only discusses two types of judicial districts, the district of seizure and
the district of trial, see Part II.C.1, to hear the motion in a third district would be beyond the
Rule's scope.
115 The location of the defendant and the location of counsel are two of the Platt factors.
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and (3) whether the defendant is a pro se movant, which is a com-
mon occurrence.1'
C. Application of the Two-Prong Test
Applying the test to the introductory hypothetical"8 demonstrates
how one could determine venue using the first prong of the proposed
test -since the trial court already conducted all the necessary factfind-
ing during the criminal trial, it should rule on the motion. However,
even if the trial court had not reviewed any relevant evidence whatso-
ever, the district of trial would still be the proper venue. Looking to
the second prong of the proposed test, since the government had a
continuing need for the property in the district of trial and the former
defendant was a pro se movant residing in the same district, these two
factors would outweigh any judicial economy concerns that may point
towards the district of seizure.
Giovanelli' is an example of a case that would be settled on the
first prong. Since the trial court appears to have examined all the facts
relevant to the property at issue,"O the proposed test directs the mo-
tion towards the district of trial. Thompson,2' however, would require
use of the second prong of the test. Assuming that additional facts
were necessary,' the factual posture warranted keeping the motion in
the district of seizure: (1) evidence documenting and relating to all of
the subject property was in the district of seizure;'3 (2) the govern-
ment no longer needed the property,"' rendering convenience to the
government a nullity; and (3) the former defendant was a pro se
movant ' who sought return of the property in the district of seizure.
If after applying the proposed test a court determines that the
present venue is improper, it should transfer the motion to the other
See note 106.
116 See Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972) (holding that a court should treat a pro se
plaintiffs pleadings and papers under "less stringent standards").
117 See, for example, Clymore, 164 F3d at 570 (noting that the movant was pro se); Garcia,
65 F3d at 19 (same); Thompson, 47 F3d at 974 (same).
118 See text accompanying notes 1-6.
119 998 F2d 116.
120 Id at 117-18.
121 47 F3d 974.
122 Since the defendant alleged that the seizure violated his constitutional rights, it is likely
that the trial court did not review evidence related to the seizure, because otherwise it would
have previously ruled on the constitutionality of the seizure. See id at 974 ("Thompson alleged
that the seizure violated his constitutional rights.").
123 Id ("[Tihe property was inventoried in Kansas City.").
124 Presumably, since the government "assert[edj that it [could not] find [the movant's]
property," it no longer had a compelling need for the items. Id at 975.
125 Id at 974 (noting that the movant was pro se).
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district under 28 USC § 1406(a).'26 There are two reasons why the
court should transfer the case rather than dismiss the motion and or-
der the former defendant to refile.'" First, 28 USC § 1406(a) requires
that a court transfer a case "if it be in the interest of justice.' 1. For
Rule 41(e) motions, the factors that would render a transfer contrary
to "the interest of justice" will rarely, if ever, be relevant.'29 Second,
transferring the case will cure any possibility of a venue gap, since the
transferee court is not supposed to reexamine the transfer decision
under this statute,' meaning that it should proceed to adjudication
rather than use the proposed test to reconsider venue. In the highly
unlikely situation that a court determines the balance is in equipoise,
it should afford more weight to the judicial economy factor because
the level of factfinding by the trial court, a subset of this consideration,
may be dispositive under the first prong of this test.
D. Benefits of the Two-Prong Test
There are three primary benefits of the proposed test. First, it is
similar to other tests for determining the proper venue under the
Criminal Rules, such as the test in Platt v Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing Co" for transfers of venue under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 21(b),3' and Judge Ralph Winter's test for laying venue in
126 "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division
or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice transfer such case to any district or di-
vision in which it could have been brought." 28 USC § 1406(a) (1994). The transfer should be
sought under 28 USC § 1406(a), as opposed to 28 USC § 1404(a), because the latter deals with
situations when there is a better venue for the motion. See 28 USC 1404(a) (1994) ("For the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."). In the case
of post-trial Rule 41(e) motions, there is only a single proper venue for the motion and hence
any other judicial district would be an improper venue.
127 See Clymore, 164 F3d at 575 (dismissing the claim and ordering the movant to refile in
the district of seizure); Garcia, 65 F3d at 21 (same); Thompson, 47 F3d at 975 (dismissing the
claim and ordering the movant to refile in the district of trial).
128 28 USC § 1406(a).
129 The three factors are whether the plaintiff brought the motion in the wrong district: (1)
for some improper or bad faith purpose; (2) to harass the defendant with litigation in a remote
forum; and (3) to forum shop. James Wm. Moore, 17 Moore's Federal Practice § 111.34[3] at 111-
165 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 1997 & Supp 2001).
130 This is true even if the transfer were done under 28 USC § 1404(a). See Wright, Miller,
and Cooper, 15 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827 at 276 (cited in note 103) (noting that, for
transfers under 28 USC § 1406(a), "[t]he doctrine of law of the case applies... There should
never be any reason for the transferee court to reexamine the decision of the transferor court
that venue was improper in that district, since even if that decision were incorrect the transfer
could have been ordered under § 1404(a).").
131 See Part III.B.1.
132 376 US 240 (1964).
133 See note 106 (discussing the operation of the Platt test).
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criminal trials under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.'3, Second,
it incorporates the concerns related to the constitutional issues in-
voked by Rule 41(e) motions and the principles behind the formula-
tion of the relevant venue rules. Finally, use of the test will eliminate
the possibility of a venue gap that exists under the current circuits'
holdings. Although it is not necessary that an amendment codify the
test in Rule 41(e), such action would obviously give credibility to its
employment by courts."
CONCLUSION
The patchwork language of Rule 41(e) makes it difficult to apply.
Courts have therefore disagreed over both the applicability of Rule
41(e) to post-trial motions and the proper venue for such motions.
This Comment suggests that Rule 41(e) is the sole procedural device
to make post-trial motions for return of seized property. However, the
Comment also rejects the notion that the Rule always directs post-
trial motions to the same venue. Rather, it argues that while limiting
the venue to one district is appropriate, neither Rule 41(e) nor its leg-
islative history specifies where to lay venue in the post-trial context. It
therefore develops a two-prong test that will channel these motions to
the appropriate judicial district. This test should assist courts in reach-
ing an accurate resolution of post-trial Rule 41(e) motions on their
merits.
134 Judge Winter uses a balancing test to determine venue under FRCrP 18. For a discussion
of Judge Winter's "substantial-contacts test," see note 12. Moreover, use of a balancing test itself
is an appropriate tool to determine venue, since the Criminal Rules were drafted with the inten-
tion of "balancing the public interest on the one hand and the rights of the defendant on the
other." Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3 at 8 (cited in note 99) (emphasis added).
135 The Advisory Committee is considering making wholesale changes to FRCrP 41, includ-
ing Rule 41(e). The proposal is in the initial stages of review by the Advisory Committee and has
yet to be sent to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Should the Stand-
ing Committee approve the proposed amendment, it will have to be subsequently approved by
the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and ultimately Congress before it will take effect.
For a discussion of the amendment process, see Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4 at
15-16 (cited in note 99). In its current format, the proposed amendment is very problematic. It
requires that individuals move in the district of seizure to return property, thereby ignoring not
only the problems that would develop if the motion were made during trial, as addressed by the
1972 Amendment, but also the policy issues discussed in Part III.A of this Comment. The Advi-
sory Committee does not offer any reason for the changes. It is quite possible, given the number
of stages remaining in the amendment process, see Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4
at 20-22, that the proposed changes will not take effect, or at least not in their current form. In
the interim, courts should interpret post-trial Rule 41(e) motions consistent with the test pro-
posed in Part III.B. Those involved in the rulemaking process should incorporate the test into the
amendment. To the extent that any amendment is ambiguous with respect to post-trial motions,
courts should interpret the new rule consistent with the approach advocated by this Comment.
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